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BRIEF OF THE STATES OF OREGON, IOWA, NEW YORK, 
CALIFORNIA, VERMONT, HAWAII, MARYLAND, DELAWARE 
 AND CONNECTICUT  
AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANTS-APPELLEES 
_______________ 
 
I. INTERESTS OF THE AMICI STATES 
Amici, all of whom are sovereign states of the United States, file this 
brief pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 29(a).1  As sovereign 
states, amici are charged with protecting and promoting the health and welfare 
of their citizens.  Citizen access to affordable medical care is necessary for the 
states to promote health, prevent disease, and heal the sick.  In our modern 
system of advanced yet costly medical care, comprehensive health insurance 
coverage is critical to achieving that end.  It is well documented that a lack of 
health insurance coverage leads to increased morbidity, mortality, and 
individual financial burdens.2 
In connection with their duties to protect and promote the health and 
welfare of their citizens, amici have engaged in varied, creative, and determined  
                                          
1  Rule 29(a) provides that “[t]he United States or its officer or 
agency or a state may file an amicus-curiae brief without the consent of the 
parties or leave of court.”  Fed. R. App. P. 29(a).  
2 See, e.g., Stan Dorn, Uninsured and Dying Because of It: Updating 
the Institute of Medicine Analysis on the Impact of Uninsurance on Mortality 
(Urban Institute Jan. 2008), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411588_uninsured_dying.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2011). 
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state-by-state efforts to expand and improve health insurance coverage in their 
states and to contain health care costs.  Despite some successes, these state-by-
state efforts have fallen short.  As a consequence, amici have concluded that a 
national solution is necessary. 
Oregon’s predicament illustrates the problem that states now face.  
Despite a variety of legislative efforts to increase access to insurance coverage, 
21.8% of Oregonians lack health insurance.  Absent health care reform, Oregon 
expects that figure to rise to approximately 27.4% in the next 10 years. 3  In 
2009, Oregon spent approximately $2.6 billion on Medicaid and CHIP.  Absent 
health care reform, that figure is expected to grow to approximately $5.5 billion 
by 2019.4 
Other states face similarly dire circumstances.  For example, in 2009, 
over 8 million Californians—nearly one in four people under the age of 65—
lacked insurance for all or part of the year.5  This represents a 28 percent  
                                          
3 Bowen Garrett et al., The Cost of Failure to Enact Health Reform: 
Implications for States, 51 (Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and the Urban 
Institute Oct. 1, 2009), available at: 
http://www.urban.org/uploadedpdf/411965_failure_to_enact.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2011).  
4 Id.  
5  Shana A. Lavarreda et al., Number of Uninsured Jumped to More 
than Eight Million from 2007 to 2009 (University of California, Los Angeles 
Mar. 2010), available at 
Footnote continued… 
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increase in the number of uninsured Californians from 2007.  Moreover, over  
5.5 million Californians were enrolled in Medi-Cal or California’s Healthy 
Families Program during 2009.6  Providing health care benefits to these 
Californians who would have been otherwise uninsured comes at a considerable 
cost to the state.  The proposed budget for the 2011–2012 Fiscal Year includes 
$83.5 billion in spending on Health and Human Services, close to 50 percent of 
which will go to Medi-Cal alone.7  Of those funds, $ 27.1 billion comes from 
the General Fund, which is facing a $25 billion deficit. 8  
The situation that states now face is unsustainable.  And without national 
reform, state-level health care costs will rise dramatically over the next 10 
years.  Even as states are forced to spend more and more to keep up with 
skyrocketing health care costs, the number of individuals without insurance will 
continue to rise if the subject health care reform is not implemented.9 
                                          
(…continued) 
http://www.healthpolicy.ucla.edu/pubs/files/Uninsured_8-
Million_PB_%200310.pdf (last visited Jan. 13, 2011). 
6  Id. 
7  2011–2012 Governor’s Budget Summary at 95–96 (Jan. 10, 2011), 
available at 
http://www.ebudget.ca.gov/pdf/BudgetSummary/FullBudgetSummary.pdf (last 
accessed Jan. 13, 2011). 
8  Id. at 4. 
9  Bowen Garrett et al., supra note 3, at 51.  
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The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) is a national 
solution that will help amici fulfill their duty to protect and promote the health  
and welfare of their citizens.  The law strikes an appropriate balance between 
national requirements that promote the goal of expanding access to health care 
in a cost-effective manner and state flexibility in designing programs to achieve 
that goal.  As the district court correctly concluded, the ACA achieves these 
goals without running afoul of any constitutional limits on federal government 
authority.  The amici urge this court to affirm the district court’s decision. 
II. INTRODUCTION 
 As the district court recognized, the nation’s health care system is in a 
state of crisis.  Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp 882, 893 (E.D. 
Mich. 2010).  As of 2008, 43.8 million people in the United States had no 
health insurance coverage and thus no or little access to health care.10  Indeed, 
Congress found that “62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are caused in part 
by medical expenses.” ACA § 1501(a)(2)(G).11  And state-level health care 
costs will only continue to rise.  These increases threaten to overwhelm already 
                                          
10  The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Early Release of 
Selected Estimates Based on Data From the 2008 National Health Interview 
Survey Table 1.1a (2009), available at 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhis/earlyrelease/200906_01.pdf (last visited 
Jan. 11, 2011). 
11  All references to ACA § 1501(A)(2) are to §1501 as amended by § 
10106 of the ACA. 
Case: 10-2388   Document: 006110850706   Filed: 01/21/2011   Page: 9
5 
 
overburdened state budgets. Without a national solution to the health care crisis, 
the amici states would be forced for the foreseeable future to spend more and 
more on health care and yet still slide further and further away from their goal 
of protecting the health and well-being of their citizens. 
The ACA will allow states to expand and improve health insurance 
coverage.  The ACA achieves coverage increases through a variety of 
mechanisms, including the implementation of a minimum coverage provision 
that requires most residents of the United States, starting in 2014, to obtain 
health insurance or pay a tax.  But among other exceptions, the minimum 
coverage provision does not apply to those whose income falls below a 
specified level or to those who can demonstrate that purchasing insurance 
would pose a hardship.12  In other words, the minimum coverage provision is 
targeted at those who, while they can afford it, choose not to purchase insurance 
and choose instead to “self insure,” relying on luck, their own financial 
reserves, and the health care social safety net of emergency rooms and public 
insurance programs to catch them when they fall ill.   
                                          
12  Individuals who will not be subject to the individual mandate 
include those with incomes low enough that they are not required to file an 
income tax return (in 2009 the threshold for taxpayers under age 65 was $9,350 
for singles and $18,700 for couples), those who would have to pay more than a 
certain percentage of their income (8% in 2014) to obtain health insurance, and 
those who can demonstrate that purchasing insurance would pose a hardship.  
ACA § 1501(e). 
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Appellants, who have chosen “not to purchase health insurance or obtain 
the government-mandated level of coverage required by the Act,” agree that the 
health care insurance market is in “need of repair.”  Appellants’ Br.  14, 30.  
They further agree that the health care insurance market generally falls within 
the Commerce Clause.  Appellants’ Br. 30.  They nevertheless maintain that the 
individual coverage provision exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause power.  
As Appellants frame their argument, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress 
to regulate only activity and not, as they characterize it, the “inactivity” of 
refusing to purchase health insurance.  But appellants ignore the effect on 
interstate commerce of refusing to comply with the minimum coverage 
provision and thus mischaracterize the conduct for which they seek this Court’s 
imprimatur as “inactivity.”  Moreover, they lose sight of the principal concern 
that animates the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause jurisprudence, namely, 
ensuring a meaningful distinction between what is truly national and what is 
truly local.  For the reasons explained below, the minimum coverage provision 
fits easily within Congress’s Commerce Clause authority. 
III. THE ACA’S MINIMUM COVERAGE PROVISION IS 
CONSTITUTIONAL. 
A. The minimum coverage provision is necessary for the success of 
health care reform and the overall stability of the nation’s health 
insurance markets. 
Any fair review of Congress’s authority under the Commerce Clause to 
enact the minimum coverage provision must be conducted in the context of 
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examining why the minimum coverage provision is crucial to national health 
care reform.  One of the primary goals of the ACA is to increase the number of 
Americans who have access to health insurance coverage.  Insurance is a 
system of shared risk.  But in a system where purchasing insurance is purely 
voluntary, people with higher than average health risks will disproportionately 
enroll in insurance plans, as an individual is more likely to purchase insurance 
when he or she expects to require health care services.  This phenomenon is 
commonly referred to as “adverse selection.” 
Adverse selection raises the cost of insurance premiums for two reasons: 
first, because adverse selection tends to create insurance pools with higher than 
average risks and premiums reflect the average cost of providing care for the 
members of the pool, the overall cost is higher.  Second, because insurers fear 
the potentially substantial costs associated with individuals with non-obvious 
high health risks disproportionately enrolling in their insurance plans, insurers 
will often add an extra loading fee to their premiums, particularly in the small 
group and individual markets.  An individual mandate addresses both of these 
problems, first by driving low-risk people into the risk pool, thus driving down 
average costs, and second by lessening the probability that a given individual is 
purchasing insurance solely because he or she knows something the insurer 
does not know about his or her health status, thereby reducing insurer hedging 
and the fees associated with adverse selection. 
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Another consequence of adverse selection is that insurers enact a variety 
of policies designed to keep high-cost individuals out of their plans and limit 
the financial cost to the plan if those individuals enroll—such as limiting 
coverage for preexisting conditions, denying coverage, charging higher 
premiums for those with actual or anticipated health problems, and imposing 
benefit caps.  While some states have attempted to grapple with this problem by 
establishing programs such as California’s Major Risk Medical Insurance 
Program, which covers otherwise “uninsurable” individuals, these programs are 
often prohibitively expensive.13  The ACA seeks to eliminate many of these 
adverse-selection avoidant practices by outlawing preexisting condition 
exclusions and requiring insurers to issue policies to anyone who applies. 
These reforms are, of course, designed to increase access to insurance.  
However, the reality is that “[i]nsurance pools cannot be stable over time, nor 
can insurers remain financially viable, if people enroll only when their costs are 
expected to be high. . .[a]nd research leaves no doubt that without an individual 
mandate, many people will remain uninsured” until they get sick.14 Young 
Americans are especially inclined to forgo purchasing health insurance in favor 
                                          
13  See Cal. Ins. Code, § 12710 et seq.; Jordan Ru, Few Can Use State 
High-Risk Pool for Uninsured, Los Angeles Times, Oct. 28, 2008. 
14 Linda J. Blumberg & John Holahan, The Individual Mandate—An 
Affordable and Fair Approach to Achieving Universal Coverage, 361 New Eng. 
J. Med. 6, 6–7 (2009). 
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of other consumption.  In California, for instance, 18 to 34 year-olds represent 
43 percent of the state’s uninsured.15  If pre-existing conditions are eliminated 
with no requirement that one purchase insurance, these people would have an 
incentive to forgo coverage until they get sick—and the high-risk pool would 
collapse from inadequate funding.16  A minimum coverage requirement that 
requires everyone to pay into the risk pool will dramatically reduce adverse 
selection, and make it practical to insist upon coverage for individuals with pre-
existing conditions. 
B. The minimum coverage provision fits within Congress’s authority 
under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
1. Congress has broad authority to regulate activities that 
substantially affect interstate commerce. 
The United States Constitution empowers Congress to “make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate Commerce . . . among the 
several States.” U.S. Const. art. I § 8, cl. 3.  The Commerce Clause power 
includes the authority to “regulate those activities having a substantial relation 
to interstate commerce, . . . i.e., those activities that substantially affect 
                                          
15  California HealthCare Foundation, California’s Uninsured at 18 
(Dec. 2010), available at http://www.chcf.org/publications/2010/12/californias-
uninsured (last visited Jan. 13, 201). 
16 See Michael C. Dorf, The Constitutionality of Health Insurance 
Reform, Part II: Congressional Power (Nov. 2, 2009), available at 
http://writ.news.findlaw.com/dorf/20091102.html (last visited Jan. 11, 2011). 
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interstate commerce.”  United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) 
(internal citations omitted). 
The Supreme Court has long understood the Commerce Clause to be an 
exceptionally wide grant of authority.  In that regard, three important principles 
have emerged from the Court’s cases that are relevant here.  First, an activity 
will be deemed to have a “substantial effect” on interstate commerce if the 
activity, when aggregated with the similar activity of many others similarly 
situated, will substantially affect interstate commerce.  Wickard v. Filburn, 317 
U.S. 111, 128 (1942).  Second, local, non-economic activities will be held to 
affect interstate commerce substantially if regulation of the activity is an 
integral or essential part of a comprehensive regulation of interstate economic 
activity, and if failure to regulate that activity would undercut the general 
regulatory scheme.  Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 18 (2005).  Third, in 
determining whether a regulated activity substantially affects interstate 
commerce within the meaning of the Commerce Clause, the Court “need not 
determine whether . . . [the regulated activities] taken in the aggregate, 
substantially affect interstate commerce in fact, but only whether a ‘rational 
basis’ exists for so concluding.  Id.  at 22 (emphasis added).  Congress’s 
judgment that an activity would undermine the statutory scheme “is entitled to a 
strong presumption of validity.”  Id. at 28. 
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Although the Commerce Clause authority to regulate interstate commerce 
is thus broad, it is not without limits.  Courts will not “pile inference upon 
inference” to find that a local, noncommercial activity that is not part of a 
comprehensive regulatory scheme nonetheless substantially affects interstate 
commerce.  Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.  In Lopez, the Court struck down the 
federal Gun-Free School Zones Act which prohibited carrying of a gun within 
1,000 feet of a school.  In finding the statute outside of the authority of the 
Commerce Clause, the Court observed that the act at issue was a criminal 
statute that had “nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic 
enterprise” and was “not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic 
activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate 
activity were regulated.”  Id. at 561.  See also United States v. Morrison, 529 
U.S. 598, 615 (2000) (sustaining Commerce Clause challenge to statutory 
provision creating federal civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated 
violence). 
Lopez and Morrison notwithstanding, the Supreme Court’s more recent 
cases have reaffirmed the broad reach of Congress’s commerce clause 
authority.   In Raich, for example, the Court upheld federal power to prohibit 
the wholly intrastate cultivation and possession of small amounts of marijuana 
for medical purposes, despite express state policy to the contrary.  545 U.S. at 
31–32.  Expressly reaffirming its holding in Wickard, the Raich Court 
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concluded that Congress had a rational basis for concluding that marijuana 
cultivation is an “economic activity” that, in the aggregate, has a substantial 
effect on interstate commerce.  Raich also makes clear that Congress may 
“regulate activities that form part of a larger regulation of economic activity.”  
Id. at 24.  In other words, Congress can regulate wholly intrastate activity to 
make effective a comprehensive regulation of an interstate market.  Id. at 36 
(Scalia, J., concurring).   Even if an activity is “’local and though it may not be 
regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by Congress 
if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce.’”  Id. at 17 
(quoting Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128) (emphasis added). 
Congress’s broad commerce power is also rooted in the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.  That clause authorizes the federal government to enact 
regulations that, while not within the specifically enumerated powers of the 
federal government, are nonetheless “‘necessary and proper for carrying into 
Execution’ the powers ‘vested by’ the ‘Constitution in the Government of the 
United States.’”  United States v. Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 1949, 1954 (2010) 
(quoting U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 18).  In other words, the Necessary and 
Proper clause permits Congress to enact regulations that are necessary or 
convenient to the regulation of commerce.  In Comstock, the Supreme Court 
recently explained that the Necessary and Proper clause provides federal 
regulatory authority where “the means chosen are reasonably adapted to the 
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attainment of a legitimate end under the commerce power or under other 
powers that the Constitution grants Congress the authority to implement.”  
Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1957. 
2. The minimum coverage provision is constitutional because it 
regulates activity that substantially affects interstate commerce 
and because it is an essential part of comprehensive regulation 
of interstate economic activity. 
a. The minimum coverage provision regulates activity that 
substantially affects interstate commerce. 
In the ACA, Congress specifically found that the minimum coverage 
requirement is “commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects 
interstate commerce.”  ACA § 1501(a)(1).17  Congress certainly had a rational 
basis for reaching that conclusion.  An individual’s decision to purchase—or 
not purchase—health insurance is an economic activity that, when taken 
together with the activities of all individuals similarly situated, substantially 
affects the market for health insurance and health care.  Appellants claim that 
an individual who fails to purchase health insurance “is neither engaged in 
economic activity nor in any other activity that would bring him or her within 
the reach of even a legitimate regulator scheme.”  Appellants’ Br. at 29.  But 
this assertion is contradicted by the reality of the health care and health 
insurance markets, where the aggregated purchasing decisions of individuals 
                                          
17  See also ACA § 1501(a)(2) (describing the effects of the minimum 
coverage requirement on the national economy).   
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who choose not to maintain health insurance—because they cannot afford it or 
for some other reason—have a powerful and generally adverse impact on those 
markets.  In the aggregate, these economic decisions regarding how to pay for 
health care services—including, in particular, decisions to forgo coverage and 
to pay later or, if need be, to depend on free care—have a substantial effect on 
the interstate health care market.  As the Supreme Court recognized in Raich 
and in Wickard, the Commerce Clause empowers Congress to regulate these 
direct and aggregate effects.  See Raich, 545 U.S. at 16–17; Wickard, 317 U.S. 
at 127–28. 
When individuals choose not to purchase health insurance, they are still 
participants in the interstate health care marketplace.  When the uninsured get 
sick, they seek medical attention within the health care system.  The medical 
care provided to the uninsured costs a substantial amount of money.  
Approximately one third of the cost of that care is covered by the uninsured 
themselves.  The remaining two thirds of the cost are passed on to other public 
and private actors in the interstate health care and health insurance system, 
including the state and federal governments, multi-state private insurance 
companies, and large multi-state employers.  Although researchers disagree as 
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to the price tag for uncompensated care, it is generally agreed that the cost is 
substantial—billions of dollars each year.18 
California’s experience illustrates the financial impact of the uninsured 
on the health care market.  Because the uninsured are often unable to pay their 
medical bills, providers shift those costs onto the insured.  Experts have 
estimated that this so-called “hidden tax” amounts to $455 per individual or 
$1,186 per family each year.19  Hospitals foot this bill as well.  In 2008, 
uncompensated care in California constituted between 5 and 7 percent of public 
hospitals’ operating expenses and 3 percent of private hospitals’ operating 
expenses.20  To put this figure in perspective, public hospitals have a median net 
income margin between 0.04% and 2.5%, whereas private hospitals have a 
median net income margin between 2.4 percent and 5 percent.21   
                                          
18  See, e.g., Dianne Miller Wolman & Wilhelmine Miller, The 
Consequences of Uninsurance for Individuals, Families, Communities, and the 
Nation, 32 J.L. Med. & Ethics 397, 402 (2004); Susan A. Channick, Can State 
Health Reform Initiatives Achieve Universal Coverage? California’s Recent 
Failed Experiment, 18 S. Cal. Interdisc. L.J. 485, 499 (2009). 
19  Peter Harbage and Len M. Nichols, Ph.D., A Premium Price: The 
Hidden Costs All Californians Pay in Our Fragmented Health Care System 
(New America Foundation, Dec. 2006). 
20  California HealthCare Foundation, California’s Health Care Safety 
Net: Facts and Figures at 19 (Oct. 2010), available at 
http://www.chcf.org/publications/2010/10/californias-health-care-safety-net-
facts-and-figures (last accessed Jan. 13, 2011). 
21  Id. at 22.   
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The cost of the uncompensated care provided to the uninsured is 
magnified by the fact that the uninsured frequently delay seeking care.  By the 
time they are treated, their medical problems are often more costly to treat than 
they would have been had they sought care earlier.22  Furthermore, because 
emergency rooms are required by federal law to screen everybody who walks 
through their doors and to provide stabilizing treatment to those with an 
emergency medical condition, much of the care for the uninsured is delivered in 
this costly and inefficient setting.  Indeed, treatment in an emergency room 
costs approximately three times as much as a visit to a primary care physician, 
at a cost of approximately $4.4 billion across the United States.23  
In addition to the direct impact on the health care and health insurance 
systems, individuals who choose to forgo insurance affect the national economy 
in other ways, including lost productivity due to poor health and personal 
                                          
22  Hearings to Examine Health Care Access and Affordability and Its 
Impact on the Economy: Before the Subcomm. on Labor, Health and Human 
Services, Education, and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 
108th Cong. (2003) (testimony of Jack Hadley, Urban Institute), available at 
http://ftp.resource.org/gpo.gov/hearings/108s/89058.txt (last visited Jan. 19, 
2011). 
23  California Association of Health Plans, 10 Factors Driving Costs 
for California’s Hospitals at 3 (Nov. 2010), available at 
http://www.calhealthplans.org/documents/IssueBriefHospitalCostDriversNove
mber2010.pdf (last accessed Jan. 13, 2011); see also USC Center for Health 
Financing, Policy, and Management, Marginal Costs of Emergency Department 
Outpatient Visits: An update using California data (Nov. 2005) available at 
ww.usc.edu/schools/sppd/research/healthresearch/images/pdf_reportspapers/mu
ltivariate_cost_paper_v5.pdf (last accessed Jan. 13, 2011). 
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bankruptcies due to health care costs, and some of the limited health care 
resources are shifted to emergency departments, rather than to preventative 
care.24  In the aggregate, economic decisions regarding how to pay for health 
care services, particularly decisions to forgo coverage, have a substantial effect 
on the interstate health care market, because the costs of providing care to the 
uninsured are passed on to everyone else through higher premiums, on average, 
over $1,000 a year, and higher health care costs.  ACA § 1501(a)(2)(F). 
b. The minimum coverage provision is an essential part of 
comprehensive regulation of interstate economic activity. 
Appellants’ Commerce Clause challenge also fails because the minimum 
coverage provision is an essential part of comprehensive regulation of the 
health care and health insurance industries.  Health insurance and health care 
are both economic activities in interstate commerce that are indisputably within 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power to regulate.  Seventeen percent of the 
United States economy is devoted to health care.  ACA § 1501(a)(2)(B).  More 
than 11 million people work in the US health care industry.25  The federal 
                                          
24 Kaiser Family Foundation, Hospital Emergency Room Visits per 
1,000 Population, 1999, available at  
http://www.statehealthfacts.kff.org/comparetrend.jsp?yr=6&sub=94&cat
=8&ind=388&typ=1&sort=a&srgn=1 (last visited Jan. 12, 2011). From 1999 to 
2008, emergency room visits rose from 365 to 404 per 1,000 population as 
uninsured rates increased. 
25  Kaiser Family Foundation, Total Health Care Employment, 2009, 
available at 
Footnote continued… 
Case: 10-2388   Document: 006110850706   Filed: 01/21/2011   Page: 22
18 
 
government has for decades been deeply involved in healthcare regulation, 
including, among other programs Medicare, Medicaid, and CHIP.  As the 
Supreme Court recently recognized, such a longstanding history helps to 
illustrate “the reasonableness of the relation between the new statute and pre-
existing federal interests.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1958. 
The minimum coverage provision is an essential component of creating 
an affordable, accessible, and robust insurance market that all Americans can 
rely on—the central goal of the ACA.  As explained above, Congress’s purpose 
in including the minimum coverage provision was to combat the problem of 
adverse selection.  It does that by incorporating healthy people into the risk 
pool, thus driving down average costs.  Moreover, without a minimum coverage 
provision, it would be impossible to prohibit insurers from excluding from 
coverage individuals with pre-existing conditions.  In short, the minimum 
coverage provision is an integral part of the ACA’s “comprehensive framework 
for regulating” healthcare, the absence of which would severely undercut 
Congress’s regulatory scheme.  It is therefore constitutional under Raich.  
(“Congress can . . . regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself 
“commercial,” . . . if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity 
                                          
(…continued) 
http://www.statehealthfacts.org/comparemaptable.jsp?ind=445&cat=8 (last 
visited Jan. 11, 2011). 
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would undercut the regulation of the interstate market in that commodity.”  
Raich, 545 U.S. at 3.). 
For the same reasons, the minimum coverage provision is a means 
“reasonably adapted” to achieving “a legitimate end under the commerce 
power.”  Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1957.  There can be no dispute that creating an 
affordable and accessible health insurance market is a legitimate Congressional 
goal, and one well within the scope of its commerce clause authority.  The 
minimum coverage provision is a reasonably adapted means to that end.  The 
provision is therefore a “necessary and proper” regulation that Congress is 
empowered to enact.  Id. 
CONCLUSION 
 Congress plainly has the power to enact the ACA.  This Court should 
therefore uphold the district court’s order dismissing appellants’ complaint. 
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